Control test data model commission

Control test data model commission

After one-time use of the path in turn have generated new pseudonyms. This means that the record is mobile recharge easy to be updated. As already api mobile recharge india mentioned, the algorithm may be known to generate the pseudonyms only the registers involved in each case. If, as in Bild9 this a pseudo-random number generator (PZZG) is used, there is a secret between the registers Ri-1 and Ri in the random number share zz1, and between Ri and Ri+ is accordingly zz2. Was problem of replay attacks has already been mentioned. An attacker could intercept a connection request message and resend. Would the pseudonyms not change after one access, an attacker could send a message several times and would for the same output message knowledge of the signaling path and api mobile recharge india therefore also on the whereabouts of MS.


Bad transferring data bandwidth is needed. The register is the previous register and the following registers known as all network communication is intercepted. Therefore, to enclose the return address is not mandatory. A register Ri may automatically save the address Ai+ of the subsequent receiver using the sender Ri +.1 A further saving can be that the subscriber instead of the key and pseudonyms only sends a short random bit each, are generated from the then the relevant data from the registers themselves. Of course, here such an algorithm must be available, which no outsider or other registers you to trace the calculations. Wisher was used the list drawn up in Chapter 2.2 attacker model when discussing api mobile recharge india the security of the proposed method. The basic assumption in this model is that the register Ri not cooperate.

Thus, the strongest attacker is a register because it can, like any outsider attacker watching the network traffic and additionally has yet information for in their own register. The resulting information gain is low. The R0 register can determine the aggressor, in which registers the level1 of the participants registered. Another register Ri may concatenate2 pseudonyms, but assign no identity. The process is therefore safe under the given specifications. In this chapter, a sharper attacker api mobile recharge india model is mobile recharge easy considered and discussed the extent to which the method presented this Stendhal. Under the attacker model 4.2.1 is the following feasible and successful attack: A register, for example, Rk is to be bridged.

Suppose, Rk is the only trustworthy registers on the signaling path of the participant. The attacker knows its thickness already all outside Rk and of course exchanged between Rk-1 and Rk or Rk and Rk+ secret. Signaled the attacked participants may watch and save the output batch B1 by Rk the attacker. But he can not concatenate the data stored in Rk Pk and Pk +.1 After forwarding the message generated Rk new pseudonyms P 'k and P' k+ (corresponding to 3.3.3). If the attacked participants signaled again, the attacker places turn the output batch B2. Since Rk+ due to the exchanged Rk api mobile recharge india mystery pseudonyms Pk+ and P 'k+ can also concatenate, can now register Rk+ Check how many times contain Pk+ in B1 and P' k+ in B2 is.

Big image
Big image
How to recharge mobile balance for free (10 Rs Daily)